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Religious Liberty and the Ukrainian State:
Nationalism Versus Equal Protection
Howard L.Biddulph*
Mikhail Gorbachev's Perestroika bequeathed to the
successor republics of the former Soviet Union a reform
commitment toward full religious liberty.' The religious liberty
laws enacted during the Perestroika Era by the Soviet
government and its subordinate republics were retained by the
new post-Soviet independent states in Russia, Ukraine, and
Belarud2
More liberal policies toward religious activity resulted,
however, in the rise of a number of new confessions in Ukraine,
Russia, Belarus' and some of the other post-Soviet states.
Nationalist forces began to demand the state protection of the
traditional churches in Russia and Ukraine against this
expanding religious pluralism, by pressing for amendments to
the original enactments on religious l i b e r t ~ . ~

* Howard L. Biddulph is currently teaching in the Department of Political
Science a t Brigham Young University. He previously taught a t University of
Victoria in Canada and Rutgers University. During the years 1991-94, he resided
in Ukraine.
1. See Sabrina Petra Ramet, Religious Policy in the Era of Gorbachev, in
RELIGIOUS POLICY IN THE SOVIETUNION, 31-52, (S.P. Ramet ed., 1993).
2. For example, the Soviet Act On Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Organizations, PRAVDA,9 Oct. 1990, a t 2; 33 Journal of Church and State, 192-201
(1991) (English translation of the act) [hereinafter USSR Actl, was followed by
similar legislation in some subordinate republics: the Russian Republic adopted the
Law On Freedom of Religion, RSFSR Law on Freedom of Religion, JPRS-UPA-90071, 18 Dec., 1990; the Ukrainian Republic adopted the Act of the Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations,
PRAVDAUKW,
April 29, 1991, a t 3 [hereinafter Ukrainian Actl. Belarus' adopted
the Law of Belarus' On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations,
MINSK, NO. 2054-XII, Dec. 17, 1992, after the collapse and termination of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
3. For an analysis of this reaction in Russia, see W. Cole Durham, et al.,
The Future of Religious Liberty in Russia, 8 EMORYINT'L L. REV. 1, 3-11 (1994);
OF
James E. Wood, Jr., The Battle Over Religious Freedom in Russia, 35 JOURNAL
CHURCHAND STATE491 (1993).
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This essay analyzes the rise of freedom of conscience in
Ukraine and the subsequent nationalist retreat from full
religious liberty during the three-year period, 1991-1994. The
"Law On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Organizations" (1991), and the "Amendments of December 23,
1993," will be examined together with the function of the
Council for Religious Affairs of Ukraine during that period.
These official Ukrainian materials will be evaluated by relating
them to the provisions on religious liberty of several
international treaties to which the Government of Ukraine is a
~ignatory.~

I. THE UKRAINIAN
RELIGIOUS
MOSAICAND THE SOVIET
LEGACY
The history of Ukrainian religiosity has been somewhat
more complex than that of Russia. While Russian culture is
historically associated with one dominant church, Ukrainian
culture draws from several major traditional faiths: Russian
Orthodoxy, an autonomous Ukrainian Orthodoxy, and Greek
Catholi~ism.~
The Russian Orthodox Church was historically the largest
confession in Ukraine. The higher clergy was overwhelmingly
Russian and this church was governed by the Patriarchate in
-

-

-

-

-

4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A,

U.N. GAOR, 21st Session, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1966), U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPRI; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, (entered into force Sept.
3, 1953), revised by Protocol Nos. 3 & 5 [hereinafter European Convention or
ECHRI; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 55.36, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.
51, U.N. Doc. A1RES136155 (1982) [hereinafter 1981 Declaration]; Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Jan. 17, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 527 [hereinafter
Vienna Concluding Document]. The former Soviet Union ratified these treaties, as
did its successor republics. See Durham, et al., supra note 3, at 13; see also Centre
for Human Rights, Status of International Instruments, at 27 (1987); Metodichni
rekomendatsii, Rada u spravakh religii pri kabineti ministriv ukraini [Handbook of
the Council for Religious Maim of Ukraine], Kiev, 1994, a t 99-100 [hereinaffer
Handbook for Religious Affairs].
5. See Frank E. Sysyn, The Formation of Modern Ukrainian Religious
Culture: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, in CHURCH,NATION,AND STATE
IN RUSSIAAND UKRAINE1 (Geoffrey A. Hosking ed., 1991); Bohdan R. Bociurkiw,
The Rise of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, 1919-1922, in CHURCH,
NATION,AND STATE IN RUSSIAAND UKRAINE 228 (Geoffrey A. Hosking ed., 1991);
John-Paul Himka, The Greek Catholic Church in Nineteenth-Century Galicia, in
CHURCH,NATION,AND STATEIN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 52 (Geoffrey A. Hosking ed.,
1991).

3211

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN UKRAINE

323

Moscow, beginning from the time of the political subordination
of most of Ukraine to the Russian Tsarist empire in the
seventeenth century. It is well to remember, however, that the
Principality of Kiev had been the original center for the
reception and spread of Orthodoxy throughout ancient Rus'
from 988 A.D., and that it remained the center of Orthodoxy in
the Russian lands until the rise of Muscovy in the late fifteenth
century6
The Russian Orthodox Church was the official state church
of the Empire until the October Revolution of 1917. It suffered
a heavy toll of political suppression during the Soviet era. All
religious property was seized by the state in 1918, and only a
fraction of it was provided for use by the Church.? A great
number of cathedrals and churches were physically destroyed
or converted to other social uses during the Stalin era? Many
members of the clergy were arrested, imprisoned, and some
were e x e ~ u t e d . ~
In an effort to enlist the propaganda efforts of the Church
for the war effort against German fascism, Stalin came to an
understanding with Russian Orthodoxy during World War 11,
which resulted in a formal accommodation in 1944.1° The
resulting partial "thaw" in church-state relations brought an
end to the most blatant forms of persecution in the latter
Stalin era and after the dictator's death, as a portion of
Orthodox parishes were officially registered.
The remaining members of the largely decimated clergy
were, however, tightly subordinated to the Communist Party
under the direction of the USSR Council for Religious AffBirs,
throughout the remainder of the Soviet era." Formally
subordinated to the USSR Council of Ministers, the Council for
6. PAUL MILIUKOV,OUTLINES OF RUSSIAN CULTURE:PART I-RELIGION AND
THE CHURCH1-26 (1942); see also Orest Subtelny, UKRAINE,A HISTORY30-39 (2d
ed., 1995).
7. See Philip Walters, A Survey of Soviet Religious Policy, in RELIGIOUS
POLICY IN THE SOVIET UNION 3-28 (Sabrina Ramet ed., 1993); see generally
WILLIAM C. FLETCHER,THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOXCHURCHUNDERGROUND
(1971);
GERHARDSIMON,DIE KIRCHENIN RUSSLAND(1970); Dimitry V. Pospielovsky, The
Survival of the Russian Orthodox Church in Her Millenial Centuly: Faith a s
Martyria in a n Atheistic State, in CHURCH,NATION, AND STATE IN RUSSIA AND
UKRAINE 271 (Geoffrey A. Hosking ed., 1991).
8. Walters, supra note 7, a t 13-16.
9. Id.
10. See Ramet, supra note 1, a t 34.
11. See Otto Luchterhandt, The Council for Religious Affairs, in RELIGIOUS
POLICYIN THE SOVIETUNION55 (S.P. Ramet ed., 1993).
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Religious Affairs (CRA) was the state arm of the Communist
Party for controlling all legal religious activity. Its prior
approval was necessary for the appointment of all Orthodox
clergy and personnel. The CRA controlled the official
registration and behavior of all recognized religious bodies. It
was staffed by operatives of the K.G.B. (secret police) and its
work was in close liaison with state security organs.'' During
the Gorbachev era of greater "openness" (glasnost'), it was
alleged in the press that the K.G.B. recruited operatives even
among the higher clergy, one of whom was Metropolitan Filaret
of Kiev, head of the Russian Orthodox Church in all of
Ukraine. l3
The Ukrainian Autocephalic (independent) Orthodox
Church differed from the Russian Orthodox Church mainly in
that it claimed independence from the Moscow Patriarchate,
established the use of the Ukrainian language, and appointed
Ukrainians, rather the traditional Russian prelates, to the
higher clergy.14 Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodoxy was
revived after the fall of Russian Tsarism in 1917, and
developed rapidly during the 1920s into a major religious force
in Ukraine. l5
During Stalin's campaign against Ukrainian nationalism in
the latter 1920s and early 1930s, the Autocephalic Church was
suppressed through the arrest of clergy and other activists, the
denial of access to churches, and a formal ban issued in
1930.16 For more than a half century after its official banning
by the Soviet regime, Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodoxy
remained a significant underground "catacomb church" in
Ukraine until it was again officially recognized in 1990, during
Gorbachev's Perestroika. l7
The western territories of Ukraine had a different political
and religious history than those of the central and eastern
regions of the country. Austrian and Polish rule of the western
12. Id*
13. Filaret resigned from his position to the Moscow Patriarchate without
publicly confirming or denying these charges. See John B. Dunlop, KGB Subversion
of Russian Orthodox Church, 1 RFEIRL RESEARCHREPORT,March 20, 1992, at 5153; see also Patricia Herlihy, Crisis in Society and Religion in Ukraine, XIV
RELIGIONIN EASTERNEUROPE1, 4-6 No. 2 (April 1994).
14. Bociurkiw, supra note 5, at 228-30.
15. Id. See also Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, The Soviet Destruction of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church,1929-1936, 22 JOURNALOF UKRAINIAN
STUDIES3, 3-21 (1987).
16. Id.
17. See Ramet, supra note 1, at 33-46; Herlihy, supra note 13, at 11.

32 11

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN UKRAINE

325

territories brought a strong Catholic influence to Ukrainians
residing in that region. Originally most of these Ukrainians
were Orthodox, but after 1596, they were forcibly incorporated
by Poland into Roman Catholic obedience.18 This Greek
Catholic Church (sometimes referred to as the Uniate
church)lg preserved an Orthodox Slavonic liturgy, but was
made allegiant to the Pope in Rome.
After the dismemberment of Poland at the end of the
eighteenth century, these territories came under Russian
Tsarist rule, and the Greek Catholics were forcibly reabsorbed
into the Russian Orthodox Church during the nineteenth
century.20 The Greek Catholic Church made a considerable
resurgence after western Ukraine became part of the
reconstituted Republic of Poland at the end of World War I?
Poland's second partitioning by Hitler and Stalin in 1939,
placed western Ukraine under Soviet rule in the Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic. Again the Greek Catholics were
forcibly reabsorbed by the state into the Russian Orthodox
Church in 1946, but continued to function as an underground
"catacomb church" until official recognition was granted in
1990.~~
Gorbachev's more liberal policy toward religious groups
stimulated underground communicants of the Ukrainian
Autocephalic Orthodox Church and the Greek Catholic Church
to boldly return t o public worship in 1989. In 1989-90, a
number of officially Russian Orthodox parishes threw off their
subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate and announced their
adherence to the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox
The Greek Catholics followed suit, seizing a major cathedral in
L'viv. During the year 1989, alone, more than fifty additional
parishes in western Ukraine transferred their allegiance from
the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate in Moscow to the Vatican in
The Ukrainian government supported the official
registration of a number of Russian Orthodox Churches during

18.
19.
20.
21.

See Himka, supra note 5, at 57-59; Subtelny, supra note 6, at 92-102.
See id. at 59.
See id. at 60-64.
Id. at 62-64; see also DONALD W. TREADGOLD, TWENTIETH CENTURY
RUSSIA 25 (5th ed. 1981).
22. See Ramet, supra note 1, at 34-46.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 38-43; see also Herlihy, supra note 13, at 4-6.
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this period, but initially refused to accept petitions for the
recognition of Ukrainian Autocephalic and Greek Catholic
Churches. The Chairman of the Ukrainian Council for
Religious Affairs even publicly claimed, erroneously, that only
Russian Orthodox believers were making requests for the
registration of churches, asserting that no other petitions had
been received.25 Several major public demonstrations by
Ukrainian Autocephalic and Greek Catholic believers then
occurred in cities of western Ukraine, involving hundreds of
thousands of participant^.^^ After Gorbachev's meeting with
' the adoption of the
Pope John Paul I1 in the V a t i ~ a n , ~and
USSR Freedom of Conscience Law in 1990, the Greek Catholic
and Autocephalic Churches were finally legally registered in
Ukraine.28
The rise of nationalism in Ukraine during the last years of
Perestroika resulted in the splitting of the Russian Orthodox
Church into two new schismatic churches. Both assumed the
title: "Ukrainian Orthodox Church," but one remained affiliated
with the Moscow Patriarchate and subject to its veto, while the
other organized a totally independent Kiev Patriarchate as its
head.29The Autocephalic Orthodox Church refused union with
the new Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev Patriarchate), in
part, because the alleged former KGB spy, Metropolitan
Filaret, had become a major figure in the latter.30
This meant that there were now three Orthodox Churches
and one reconstituted Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine, each
bitterly contesting the claims of the others for jurisdiction over
parishes, disputing the use and future control of church
buildings and other property. The vigorous opposition of the old
Russian Orthodox Church to the legal recognition of these rival
confessions, combined with the previously described public
social protest mobilized by the other major churches, resulted
.~~
in an atmosphere of considerable religious a n t a g ~ n i s mThis
was only heightened by the expectation that the government
would soon redistribute properties previously appropriated by

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See Ramet, supra note 1, at 34 (citing Keston News Service).
Id. at 43-52.
See id. at 36.
See id. at 43.
See Herlihy, supra note 13, a t 8-9.
Id. a t 8-9.
Id. a t 8-9; see also Ramet, supra note 1, a t 43-52.
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the Soviet regime. Tension mounted as each denomination laid
claim to disputed properties.32
In addition to the contending traditional churches, several
small Protestant Churches had existed in Ukraine fiom the
late nineteenth century: Evangelical Christians and Baptists,
who combined into one denomination during the Soviet era,
~~
Evangelical Christian Baptist
and the A d ~ e n t i s t s .Some
congregations were registered during the Soviet era, although a
schismatic Baptist "Initsiativniki" sect was considered illegal
due to its unwillingness to follow the restrictive laws of the
Soviet government .34 A few Adventist congregations also
functioned with state registration in Ukraine during the Soviet
period.
Following the adoption of the USSR Freedom of Conscience
Law in 1990, a number of smaller confessions achieved legal
recognition in Ukraine. In addition to the Evangelical Christian
Baptists and Adventists, they included the Latin-rite Roman
Catholic Church, Pentacostals, Methodists, Lutherans, The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), The
Church of Christ (Campbellites),Jewish synagogues, Jehovah's
Witnesses, The Unification Church of the Reverend Moon,
Islamic sects, Baha'i, and Hare Krishna, among others.35 A
few illegal or semilegal offshoot sects fiom Orthodoxy also
operated in Ukraine, the most notorious of which was "The
White Brotherhood," which was suppressed by police action in
the summer of 1993, following doomsday threats of mass
ritualistic suicides.36
In summary, the Ukrainian religious mosaic has been one
of an increasing pluralism of faiths. Both Tsarist and Soviet
governments sought to forcibly reduce or eliminate religious
pluralism by suppressing major alternatives to the Russian
Orthodox Church, although a few small sects were tolerated a t
a minimal level. Gorbachev's Perestroika not only restored
32. A most prominent example of this was the prolonged month long sit-in
that we witnessed at the front gate of the famous Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kiev
during the winter of 1992.
LANE, CHRISTIAN
RELIGION
IN THE SOVIETUNION146-48
33. See CHRISTEL
(1978); Gerhard Simon, Staatlicher Druck under Kirchlicher Widerstand. Die
Abgespaltene Baptistische Gruppe der Sogenannten Initsiatiwniki, OSTEUROPA,
S ~ A R TJuly
, 1969, at 503-04.
34. LANE,supra note 33, at 146-48.
35. Ramet, supra note 1, at 43-52.
36. AX. Vladimirov, Byeloe bratstv+'ostanny
den' prikhoditi [The White
KIEV, July 13, 1993, at 3.
Brotherhood-The 'Last Day' Arrives], HOLOSUKRAINY,
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religion to a position of social respectability for the first time
since 1917, but the "Law On Freedom of Conscience" of 1990,
was the first legislative enactment genuinely establishing
religious liberty in the history of the Eastern Slavic peoples.
Perestroika leR a legacy to post-Soviet Ukraine of the full legal
recognition of religious pluralism.
As already shown, however, the Ukrainian reality a t the
demise of the Soviet Union was of a rapidly increasing
pluralism of religious confessions in which serious unresolved
antagonisms remained among the major churches. It was
feared that religious conflict might reinforce existing regional
cleavages in Ukraine, as the Russian Orthodox Church was the
major confession in the eastern russified areas, the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church was strong in Kiev and the center, and the
Greek Catholic and Autocephalic Churches were predominant
in the western territories.

The enactment by the USSR Supreme Soviet of the "Law
On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" in
1990, was followed by corresponding legislation in some of the
constituent republics.37 In Kiev, the Supreme Soviet of the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic enacted a "Law On
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" on April
23, 1991, which followed the main provisions of the All-Union
Law, but also sought to address the unique problems of the
Ukrainian religious mosaic discussed above. This law was
retained by the new Republic of Ukraine after independence
was proclaimed and the USSR was dismantled at the end of
1991.~~
Like its precursor at the all-union level, the Ukrainian
Law of April 23, 1991, was an historic charter on freedom of
conscience for all perspectives regarding religion, although, as
will be shown, it was not without flaws. Its main provisions
will be compared to the standards on religious liberty of several
international human rights treaties to which Ukraine is a
~ignatory.~'
The act defines freedom of conscience as follows:

37. See supra note 2.
38. Id.
39. See sources cited supra note 4.
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All citizens shall have the guaranteed right of freedom of
conscience. The above right shall include the freedom to have,
to adopt and to change religion or convictions at one's own
choice and the freedom to profess individually or together
with other persons any religion or to profess no religion, to
establish religious cults, to express openly and to spread
freely one's own religious or atheistic conviction^.^^

The above provisions of the Ukrainian Act appear to be in
compliance with Article 9 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and ~reedoms;~
and with Article
18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
~ i g h t s ?in~ all respects except for one important exception.
These international human rights treaties, to which Ukraine is
a signatory, begin with the phrase: "Everyone has the right,"
whereas the Ukrainian Law uses the much less inclusive
phrase: "All citizens shall have the right.""
The official handbook used by The Council for Religious
M a i r s during the years, 1991-1994, claimed that "freedom of
conscience is guaranteed in Ukraine to anybody who stays on
While this is
its territory irrespective of the period of ~tay.'"~
what the 1991 law ought to say in order to be compatible with
international human rights commitments, it is not how the text
actually reads. The inadvertent or intentional exclusion of
noncitizens from the full rights and freedoms of the Act is a
serious flaw, and particularly so when considering the
amendments to the Act which were passed on December 23,
1993, which will presently be considered.
While granting freedom of conscience to all, the Ukrainian
Act, like its all-union counterpart, established no dominant
church or churches, nor did it employ the terms, "traditional"
and %on traditional," in making any distinctions among
confession^.^^ As Article 5 declares: "All religions, faiths, and
religious organizations shall be equal before the law.
Establishment of any advantages or restrictions for one

40. Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, art. 3.
41. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 9U).
42. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 18(1); see also ECHR, supra note 4, arts. 9-10;
Durham, et al., supra note 3, at 14-15.
43. Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, arts. 1-4, 6, 23-24, 27-28.
44. Handbook for Religious Affairs, supra note 4, at 8.
45. Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, arts. 3, 5, 8.
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religion, faith or religious organization to the prejudice of
others shall be prohibited?
In addition to the non establishment of any dominant
church, there were provisions expressly separating church and
state:? and separating the state educational system from the
church.48 The Act also went so far as to explicitly prohibit
government financing of bodies promoting, conducting, or
opposing religion."
The Law On the Freedom of Conscience envisages the state
exercising benevolent neutrality toward legally equal religious
bodies. In contrast to the old USSR Constitution of the
Brezhnev era,50 Article 1 includes a recounting of "duties of
the state to religious organizations," which precedes the stating
of duties of religious organizations to the state and society.51
One of these enumerated state "duties" is to "overcome the
negative consequences of state policy with respect to religion
and church" of the previous Soviet era.52 In this connection,
religious bodies are granted the right to make claims for the
return of properties formerly appropriated by the state.53The
Act also makes voluntary contributions and other acquired
income of religious organizations tax exempt, except revenues
derived from profit-making economic enterprise^.^^
The liberating of religious association from state
domination in Ukraine is further indicated by the provision
which frees a local "religious community," (parish or
congregation) from the obligation to notify state authorities of
~ ~ conforms to Principle 16(d) of the
its e ~ t a b l i s h m e n t .This
Vienna Concluding Document of the conferen& on Security
and Cooperation in Europe that were promulgated in 1 9 8 9 . ~ ~
Prescribed procedures for official registration by the state are
necessary, according to the Ukrainian Act, for the religious

46. Id. art. 5.
47. Id.
48. Id. art. 8.
49. Id. art. 5.
50. Konstitutsiia SSSR [Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics] (1977). For an English translation see DONALDD. BARRYAND CAROL
BARNER-BARRY,
CONTEMPORARY
SOVIETPOLITICSapp. A (3d ed. 1987).
51. Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, art. 1.
52. Id.
53. Id. art. 17.
18-19.
54. Id.
55. Id. art. 8.
56. Vienna Concluding Document, supra note 4, princ. 16(d).
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community to become a "legal person," entitled to enter into
contracts or legally binding actions, such as the sponsoring of
visas for foreign visitors.57A decision by the state respecting
an application for official registration must be rendered within
30 days. Denial of registration must be justified in writing and
this decision may be appealed to the courts.58
The Ukrainian Act legitimized the actions of a number of
religious communities that had changed affiliation from the
Russian Orthodox Patriarchate to the Greek Catholic Church
or the Autocephalic Orthodox Church, in spite of the protests
from the Russian Church. "The state shall recognize the right
of a religious community to be subordinate in canonical
organizational matters to any religious center (administration)
acting either in the Ukrainian SSR or beyond its boundaries
and to change such subordination a t its own dis~retion."~~
Religious bodies are empowered by the Act to own property,
printing establishments, and economic productive enterprises
(such as a farm); to operate charities, seminaries, monasteries,
and retreats; and to conduct religious e d u ~ a t i o n .Individual
~~
believers are assured the right, as parents or legal guardians,
to bring up their children in their own religious values.61
These expanded rights and powers conform to the provisions
for protecting religious liberty specified in the Vienna
Concluding Document of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.62
Such individual and organizational rights were also
extended to international relations by Article 24 of the original
1991 Act without any significant restrictions. "Religious
organizations and believers shall have the right either
individually or together with others to establish and maintain
international relations and direct personal contacts."63
Participants going and coming have the right "to carry with
them religious literature and other information materials of
religious content." Religious organizations were assured the
right "to send citizens abroad to study at clerical institutions

Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, art. 8.
Id. arts. 24-25.
Id. art. 8.
Id. arts. 6, 10, 17-20, 22-23.
Id. art. 3.
Vienna Concluding Document, supra note 4, princs. 16(a-k).
Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, art. 24.
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and receive foreign citizens for similar purposes."64 The
revision of Article 24 was the main objective of the
amendments of December 23, 1993, which will be examined
below.
The Act specifies that religious organizations with
"governing centers" abroad may freely carry out their activities
in Ukraine if they do not breach Ukrainian l e g i ~ l a t i o n . ~ ~
Agreements are to be made between the state and these foreign
religious centers, and their activities are expected to conform to
such agreements?
The Act also provides for the dissolution of religious
communities by their members. In very terse language, Article
16 originally provided for the termination of religious
communities also "by j ~ d g e r n e n t . ' ~This
~
implies judicial
decision, but no process or appeal procedure is outlined. The
amendment of this article in December 1993, will also be
discussed below.
Although greatly enlarging the breadth of religious
activity, the Act also specifies some restrictions. First, Article 3
declares that the manifesting of religious convictions is subject
to those restrictions "necessary for the protection of public
security and order, life, health and morality as well as the
rights and fkeedoms of other citizens."68 This has some
similarity to provisions of international human rights
documents, but is a somewhat more vague formulation of
permissible state restrictions.
Article 9(2) of the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Freedoms is identical to Article 18(2) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in
providing that "Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs
shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by
law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.n69

64. Id.
65. Id. art. 9.
66. Id.
67. Id. art. 16.
68. Id. art. 3.
69. European Convention, supm note 4, art. 9(2); ICCPR, supm note 4, art.
18(2).

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN UKRAINE

As Durham, Homer, van Dijk, and Witte have pointed out,
the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted this to
mean that any interference with religious liberty must be
motivated "by a pressing social need, and must be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued." State interference
should be no greater than necessary and should utilize the
Yeast intrusive means po~sible."'~This more restrictive
language might have improved the Ukrainian provision in
protecting against the possibility of administrative abuse.
The second restriction is mentioned in Article 5. "No
religious organization shall intervene in activities of other
religious organizations, carry out any kind of preaching of
hostility, intolerance to disbelievers and believers of other
faiths."" The inclusion of this provision is understandable
given the religious conflict during the Gorbachev era, but it is
unfortunately very vague. There is no clear definition of what
constitutes hostility or intolerance. Does, for example, the
teaching of one of the Orthodox Churches that it alone is the
"true Orthodox faith," and that other churches have "departed
from correct teachings and proper authority," constitute
"hostility" or "intolerance?" If so, probably all confessions would
be guilty of breaching the law. If hostility means something
beyond the expression of doctrinal disagreement, then this
needs to be specified. The failure to do so leaves the door open
for selective administrative abuse of nontraditional, politically
unpopular confessions.
A third restriction is mentioned in Article 4. No one may
"evade the fulfillment of duties established by the
Constitution," by reference to religious convictions, although
specific legislation can provide "the substitution of the
fulfillment of one duty for another by reason of one's
~onvictions."'~A separate law, for example, provides
alternative service for conscientious objectors to military
service on religious gr~unds.'~Thefreedom of conscience of
minorities might have been more adequately safeguarded,
however, if some more encompassing statement had been
entrenched in this basic law rather than depending on
additional specific legislation as each case arises.

70. Durham, et al., supra note 3, at 16-17.
71. Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, art. 5.
72.

Id.

73. Handbook for Religious Affairs, supra note 4, at 14.
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The Law On Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Organizations contains additional provisions designed to
control and mediate religious conflict which deserve analysis.
Article 17 invests the executive committees of regional
governments with the responsibility of resolving disputes
concerning the "possession or use of cult buildings and
property."74The decisions of these bodies can be appealed in
the
"Any unauthorized seizure of cult buildings or
appropriation of cult property shall be p r ~ h i b i t e d . " ~ ~
The main device of the Act for preventing religious conflict
from reinforcing regional political conflict is to deny religious
organizations the right to participate in political affairs.77
"Religious organizations shall not take part in activities of
political parties and shall not support them financially, shall
not nominate persons as their candidates to the state bodies of
power, shall not carry out agitation or financing of election
campaigns of any candidates to the said bodies."78
This is not, however, a complete ban on personal political
activity. Article 5 permits priests and clerics to "take part in
political life to the same extent as all citizens," but not as
representatives of religious bodies.7gReligious bodies are also
assured of the right "to take part in social life and to use mass
media to the same extent as social organizations," except
(presumably) to participate in political campaign^.^'
Perhaps the most significant departure of the Ukrainian
Act from the original USSR Act, was in its retaining of a fairly
significant regulatory role for the State Council for Religious
Mairs. Since the Council for Religious Affairs had been a
Soviet device for state suppression of freedom of conscience, the
USSR Act in Moscow reduced the role of this agency to
providing information and assistance to religious communities,
and helping them establish international ties.81 The Russian
Republic Freedom of Conscience Law in 1990, went even
further, totally abolishing the Council for Religious

74. Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, art. 17.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. art. 5.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. USSR Act, supra note 2, arts. 12, 24.
82. Cfi USSR Act, supra note 2 with RSFR Law On Freedom of Religion,
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The Ukrainian Act, however, presemed the Council for
Religious Affairs, no doubt because of the perceived need to
monitor and ameliorate the conflicts which existed among
major confession^.^^ The resolution of conflicts among
religious organizations and control over their adherence to the
Act was give to "local city councils and their executive
committee^."^^ The Act assigns the Council for Religious
Affairs to assist local government bodies "to ensure the state
policy in respect of religions and the church."85
In addition to information and assistance functions, the
Council for Religious Affairs is to "carry out the registration of
the charters of religious organizations . . . as well as the
amendments and supplements to such charters."86 The
Council for Religious Affairs used this power over registration,
together with its control over information, in the early 1990s to
gradually regain the traditional regulatory power over religious
bodies that it had enjoyed during the Soviet period, as will be
shown below. The decision, therefore, to preserve a fairly
strong Council for Religious Affairs, as I shall show in Part IV,
worked toward the gradual reduction of religious autonomy
from the state.
On balance, the Law on the Freedom of Conscience and
Religious Organizations was an historic achievement in the
establishment of human liberty in Ukraine, although, as I have
shown, it was not without significant weaknesses. The Act
created legal circumstances which promoted the rapid
expansion of religious activity and the proliferation of many
new confessions.
NATIONALISM, AND THE 1993
111. RISINGPLURALISM,
AMENDMENTS
The collapse of communism was accompanied by a
widespread spiritual crisis which led many people in the former
Soviet Union to undertake a search for religious values.87 In
Ukraine, a number of people returned to some version of the
supra note 2.
83. Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, art. 30.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Lyudmila Vorontsova & Sergei Filatov, Religiosity and Political
Consciousness in Post Soviet Russia, 22 RELIGION,STATE, AND SOClETY 397, 399401 (1994).
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Orthodox religious heritage, although the splintering of the
Church into separate antagonistic confessions confused and
alienated a significant portion of the population? Others
expressed keen disappointment in Orthodoxy after reading
revelations in the press showing the close ties of the Church to
the Communist Party and secret police during the Soviet
era?'
This resulted in fairly weak public support for traditional
Orthodoxy in Ukraine. Polls seem to indicate that personal
religious belief grew rapidly among former citizens of the
Soviet union, with an increasingly large group avoiding any
denominational affiliation. Others took advantage of the
opportunities provided by the Freedom of Conscience Law to
investigate the newer, nontraditional faiths which were
increasingly available through foreign evangelism. The
Latinrite Catholic Church, a wide variety of Protestant
evangelical groups, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints (Mormons), Jehovah's Witnesses, the Unification Church
of the Reverend Moon, Hare Krishnas, Islamic sects, Baha'i,
the White Brotherhood, and others were active, quickly
establishing groups of local adherent^.^'
The Council for Religious Affairs has estimated that on
January 1, 1990, there were 6,000 local religious communities
(registered parish associations) in Ukraine, but by January 1,
The number of communities and
1994, there were 15,000.~~
the pluralism of denominations were both expanding rapidly.
While constituting only a small fraction of the total population,
(estimates indicate no more than I%), the newer confessions
grew rapidly during the 1991-94 period. Significant foreign
evangelical support was given for such activities as evangelistic
crusades, lectures, conferences, media advertising,
humanitarian service, literature, and missionaries.
Leading prelates of the Orthodox Churches of Eastern
Europe and the new states of the former Soviet Union began to
publicly speak out during 1992-93, opposing the international
missionary support for the newer confession^.^^ These appeals
88. Id. at 401.
89. Id.
90. See Ramet, supra note 1, at 43-52; Vorontsova & Filatov, supra note 87,
at 99-101.
91. Handbook for Religious Affairs, supra note 4, at 3-4.
92. See Wood, supra note 3, at 499-500; see also Natsionalnost' i religii,
m V D A UKRAWII, Aug. 14, 1992, at 3.
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received favorable attention from some nationalists who
enjoyed positions of political influence in Ukraine.93
The political legitimacy of post-Soviet Ukraine, like that of
the other successor states of former USSR, is strongly
associated with the task of restoring a traditional national
culture, long suppressed within a multinational empire. The
state was considered to have the task of restoring the
predominance of Ukrainian language, history, music, art, and
other traditional cultural institutions that had been suppressed
by Russian Tsarism and the Soviet regime.
Traditional religious institutions were among these
casualties of the Soviet period, and some nationalists viewed
the state as having the obligation to restore historically
dominant faiths that had been decimated by the communists in
order to bring about the spiritual renewal of Ukrainian society.
The restoration of traditional faiths was now being threatened
by the flowering of the strange new religions "imported from
abroad," which were supported by the ample human and
material resources of international evangelism. Those taking
such a position believed that, to promote the reflowering of
Ukrainian nationalism and spiritual renewal of society, the
state should erect protective barriers against the importing of
increased religious pluralism.94
The problem for the nationalist religious agenda was that
the Law On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Organizations did not provide any legal basis for the selective
fostering or restricting of personal or group religious activity
domestically or internationally. As previously shown, this Act is
a charter for the equal protection of all perspectives about
religion. "All religions, faiths and religious organizations shall
be equal before the law. Establishment of any advantages or
restrictions for one religion, faith or religious organization to
the prejudice of others shall be pr~hibited."~
In 1992, the Ukrainian Parliament established the
powerful "Parliamentary Commission For Spiritual
Enlightenment and Renewal of Society." Its official objective
was to fulfill the task mentioned in Article 1 of the Law On
Freedom of Conscience: to "overcome the negative consequences

93. Id.
94. Id.; cf. also John Anderson, RELIGION,
STATE AND POLITICS
IN THE SOVIET
STATES221 (1994).
UNIONAND SUCCESSOR
95. Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, art 5.

338

BRIGHAMYOUNGUNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [I995

of the (past Soviet) state policy in respect to religion and
society."96
T h e P a r l i a m e n t a r y Commission on S p i r i t u a l
Enlightenment and Renewal of Society demonstrated its
commitment to the nationalist agenda by drafting and
proposing some important amendments to the Law On
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, which
were adopted by the Parliament on December 23, 1993."
President Leonid Kravchuk signed these amendments into law
in January 1994.'~
The nationalist revision of the Freedom of Conscience Law
in Ukraine did not involve a direct and wholesale attack on the
egalitarian provisions of the original Act. The latter, more
drastic strategy had been followed by the nationalists in
Moscow, who sought to fundamentally change the Russian
Freedom of Religion Law in the August 1993 amendments. The
international uproar against the Russian amendments was
sufficient to cause President Boris Yel'tsin to refuse to sign
them, even though they had been passed overwhelmingly by
the Russian P a r l i a ~ n e n t . ~ ~
The nationalist revision in Kiev was more adroit. The
egalitarian principles of the original act did not need to be
gutted to attain the nationalists' objective. Since the original
Act granted freedom of conscience and manifestation of
religious beliefs specifically "to citizens," all that the revisers
felt needed to be done was to amend it to seriously restrict the
religious freedom of "noncitizens" in Ukraine, and to prevent or
drastically restrict the entry of human and material resources
from abroad. Ukrainian officials could still claim, in their view,
that its legislation maintains full freedom of conscience and
equal religious liberty rights for all Ukrainian citizens, just as
in the original 1991 Act.
I shall argue that the effect of the 1993 Amendments to
Article 24 and 16 is a significant reduction of religious freedom
both for noncitizens and citizens in Ukraine. Furthermore, the
restriction of religious rights for foreigners in Ukraine is an

96. P . Yefimov, Novaya kommissiya Radi, HOLOS U K R m , KIEV, Aug. 9,
1992, at 3.
97. P. Ivanenko, Novoe Zakorudatel'stvo o religii, HOLOS U-,
KIEV, Dec.
29, 1993, at 4-5.
98. Novoe Zakonodatel'stvo o religii, HOLOSU r n , KIEV, Jan. 9, 1994, at 4 .
99. See Durham, et al., supm note 3, at 9-10.

32 11

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN UKRAINE

339

equally serious violation of international human rights
commitments as it is a reduction of citizen rights.

A. The Amendment to Article 24
As shown above, the original form of Article 24 offered no
significant restrictions upon international religious relations or
upon the religious activities of foreigners in Ukraine.'" The
Amendment approved by the Ukrainian Parliament, however,
involved a major curtailment of international religious contact:
Clergymen, preachers of religion, instructors (teachers), and
other representatives of foreign organizations who are foreign
citizens temporarily staying in Ukraine, may preach religious
dogmas, perform religious rites and practice other canonic
activities only in those religious organizations on whose invitations they came, and upon an official agreement with the
state body which has registered the statute of the corresponding religious organization.lo'

The first thing to notice about the Amendment to Article
24 is that it effectively bars entry of all foreign representatives
of faiths that do not already exist as legal entities in Ukraine.
This is the effect of the requirement that they must be personally invited by an already legally registered religious community, because no other confession is likely to extend such an invitation. This not only curtails the manifesting of religious beliefs
by noncitizens in Ukraine, but also effectively prevents the
access of Ukrainians to any totally new faith.
This amendment seriously disadvantages foreigners in
Ukraine, in comparison to citizens, in the exercise of religious
liberty. As previously emphasized, all of the international human rights instruments consistently require that the freedom
of religion and expression be extended to all persons. The restrictions on the right of foreigners to teach religious values o r
to perform religious rites in Ukraine is a considerable narrowing of the freedom of expression that they enjoyed before the
amendment came into force, and is incompatible with a number
of provisions of international human rights documents.lo2

100. Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, art. 24.
101. Handbook for Religious Affairs, supra note 4, at 84-85.
102. ICCPR, supra note 4, arts 18-19; ECHR, supra note 4, arts. 9-10; see also
Durham, et al., supra note 3, at 14-15.
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In addition, the Amendment to Article 24 also narrows the
religious liberty of Ukrainian citizens. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees to all persons the
"right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers."lo3In excluding representatives
of new faiths and in limiting the activities of those who can get
into the country, the Amendment to Article 24 violates this
provision, as well as Article 6 of the Ukrainian Act, which
assures citizens full access to religious information and proclaims "the right to study any religious teaching."lo4It may
also be argued that since the newer confessions are dependent
on the training and teaching help of foreign representatives,
that the Amendment disadvantages them, thus violating the
equal treatment provision of Article 5 of the Ukrainian Act.'"
The second observation to be made about the Amendment
to Article 24, is that it is designed to prevent any further geographical expansion of religious work already established in
Ukraine by foreign representatives of newer confessions, because they can work only in the location of the already registered religious group that officially invited them. Foreign religious workers in Ukraine may not expand their activity to any
new cities. The Council for Religious Affairs has confirmed this
interpretation in its handbook on the Act.'06 This aspect of
the Amendment also violates the same international human
rights provisions and Articles of the 1991 Ukrainian Act as
discussed above, inasmuch as it reduces the rights of both
noncitizens to manifest their religious beliefs and limits the
right of citizens to receive information about new faiths.
Third, the Amendment is vague or ambiguous in saying
that foreign teachers may preach or perform rites "only in
those religious organizations on whose invitations they
came."lo7Does this mean that they may serve only in the city
where the inviting organization exists, or does it mean that
they may serve only on the premises of the building owned or
rented by it for worship services? If the latter, more restrictive
interpretation is adopted, foreign teachers are effectively de-

103. ICCPR, supra note 4, art 19; see also 1981 Declaration, supra note 4, art.
6.

104.
105.
106.
107.

Ukrainian Act. supra note 2, art. 6.
Id. art. 5.
Handbook of Religious Maim, supra note 4, at 84-85.
Id.
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nied any public evangelical functions other than participating
in worship services. The less restrictive interpretation would
permit foreign teachers to teach within the city limits where
the inviting organization operates, and would, therefore, allow
evangelical work with people who are not members of the religious community.
This provision of the Amendment has been interpreted
both ways by regional representatives of the Council for Religious Affairs, and the official handbook says nothing to resolve
the ambiguity.lo8The more restrictive interpretation violates
the provisions of international treaties by denying the right of
noncitizens to spread their beliefs to nonbeliever^.'^^ The less
restrictive interpretation violates the same provisions discussed
in the first two points. The fact that this provision is left ambiguous in the Amendment and in the interpretation by the
Council for Religious Affairs is itself an uncertainty that restricts free expression in an unwarranted manner.
Fourth, the invitation of the local religious community is
not sufficient to obtain a visa for a foreign religious volunteer.
The invitation must be approved by the regional or local government body that registered the religious community. Denial
of state approval of the invitation requires no explanation to
the local church, and there is no appeal. In actuality, the Council for Religious Affairs controls this process through its regional representative, whose recommendation to the regional government is accepted as the will of a superior Republic level
agency that is de facto as powerful as a central ministry.110
The control over visas for foreign religious teachers is,
therefore, totally in the hands of representatives of the Council
for Religious AfYairs, who are free to implement their own
agenda or their own personal prejudices. This provision reveals
that the religious communities have no autonomy from the
state whatsoever in the invitation of foreign citizens for religious contacts under the Amendment.

B. The Amendment of Article 16
The Amendment to Article 16 also significantly weakens
religious liberty in the Ukrainian Freedom of Conscience law.
108. Id.
109. European Convention, supra note 4, art. 9; ICCPR,supra note 4, art. 18.
110. Interviews with CRA Regional Representatives in Donetsk (May 1993) and
in Odessa and Simferopol (March 1994).
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This article is concerned with procedures for terminating or
discontinuing a legally established local religious organization.
The original tersely worded Article 16 permitted the state
to terminate a local religious association "by judgement," presumably when its representatives breach the responsibilities
required by the Act. The original article provided no judicial
process or remedies or statement of cause. The Amendment
also fails to outline judicial process or remedies, but expands
causes for termination into a very extensive list of vaguely
stated violations.
The list of grounds for "terminating the activity of a religious community" by the state are as follows:
If it encourages religious hostility and hatred toward unbelievers and believers of other confessions; if it humiliates
national dignity or insults the feelings of citizens on the basis
of their religious convictions; if it compels citizens to confess
or refuse to confess a particular religion, to participate or not
participate in church services, religious rites and ceremonies,
religious studies; if it causes harm to the health of citizens,
licentiousness and other infringements upon personal dignity
and rights of citizens under the pretext of performing religious rites and ceremonies; if it systematically, flagrantly
violates legal regulations regarding the performing of public
church services, religious rites, ceremonies and processions; if
it teaches citizens not to perform their constitutional obligation, involving violations of civil order or infringement of
rights and property of civil, state or religious organization~.~"

None of these grounds are described in careful legal language. Such an exceedingly detailed, yet vaguely worded,
amendment would seem to provide almost endless possibilities
for administrative officials to bring charges against an unpopular or unfavored religious body in court. Its effect is to impose a
chilling restraint on the freedom of religious expression by
comparison with the original 1991 Act.
The Amendment specifies that charges may be brought by
a prosecutor or the regional government that originally registered the association. Yet regional governments came to depend
on recommendations by representatives of the Council for Religious Affairs during the 1991-94period. The Amendment pro-

111. Handbook for Religious Mairs, supra note 4, at 57-58.
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vides no appeal or redress from the decision of the court. Once
the court "terminates all its activity," the religious community
has all of its assets appropriated by the state without compensation or appeal.ll2 The effect of such a draconian and vaguely worded Amendment is to further reduce the autonomy and
freedom of religious communities from the control of state administrators.
To summarize, the 1993 Amendments effectively reduce
the religious liberties originally provided under the Ukrainian
Freedom of Conscience Law. They not only seriously disadvantage noncitizens in the manifesting of their religious beliefs,
but they also diminish the right of freedom of information of
religious seekers in Ukraine who desire alternatives to the
traditional faiths. The disadvantaging of the newer religious
bodies violates the "equal protection of all faiths and perspectives" of the Act. The expansion of vaguely worded grounds for
the state liquidation of an unfavored religious body is a significant brake on freedom of expression.
FOR RELIGIOUS
IV. THE RISE AND FALLOF THE COUNCIL
AFFAIRS

As previously explained, the 1991 Act granted the Council
for Religious Affairs powers to help "ensure the state policy respecting religions,"ll3 that were greater than those provided
in the USSR Act. Nowhere in the 1991 Act, however, was it
anticipated that the Council for Religious M a i r s would again
become the centralized powerful agency for controlling religious
practice that it had been during the Soviet era. This is what
the Council for Religious Affairs became, however, during the
1991-94 period.
In 1992, the Council for Religious Affairs was granted
control over the registration of visas for foreign religious volunteers by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.'" The Office of Visa
Registration (OVIR) acted only upon the approval of the Council.l15 The 1993 Amendments gave the Council for Religious
Affairs de facto control also over the invitation process for the
granting of visas, as explained above.

112.
113.
114.
Ukraine
115.

Id.
Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, art. 30.
Interviews with representatives of the Office of Visa Registration, in Kiev,
(August 1992).
Id.
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By May 1993, the Republic Council for Religious Aff'airs
had centralized its direction of regional representatives, so that
its approval was necessary for their granting of registration of
charters for religious communities applying for legal recognition.ll6 The Council began also to direct regional representatives in the approval or denial of visa invitations for foreign
religious workers, sometimes giving orders about which groups
could invite foreign representatives and what the goals would
be.'l7 There is some evidence that regional government representatives took direction from the Council and its regional
representatives on religious questions much as they would from
a regular Republic-level Ministry.l18 The broader and vaguer
grounds for judicially liquidating unfavored religious bodies,
contained in the Amendment to Article 16, gave the Council
greater power to exercise discipline and control.
The Chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs was Mr.
A. Zinchenko, who also was a deputy in Parliament until the
election of 1994, and who was closely associated with the nationalists on the Commission for Spiritual Enlightenment and
the Renewal of Society. The Council for Religious Affairs had
achieved sufficient central control over the regulation of religious bodies by 1993, that it was well suited to become the
vehicle for implementing the new, more restrictive religious
policy.
No official data is available concerning the implementation
of the 1993 Amendments by the Council for Religious Affairs.
Religious leaders in various cities claimed, however, that there
was a radical reduction in the granting and renewal of visas for
foreign religious workers during the close of 1993 and the entire year of 1994.'" By June 1994, they claimed that foreign
religious workers associated with evangelical work, humanitarian service, and leadership training in the newer confessions
had been reduced to a very small number.120
In the controversies between the major traditional churches, the Council for Religious Affairs was accused by major rival
prelates of favoring the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev
116. Interviews with CRA Regional Representatives, in Donetsk (May 1993)
and Khar'kov (June 1993).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Interviews with religious leaders in Kiev, Donetsk, Khar'kov, Odessa, and
Simferopol (February, March, May, and June 1994).
120. Id.
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Patriarchate) and of exercising too much authority over religious life. Their recommendation to the Parliament was that
the Council for Religious Affairs be abolished.l2'
In the parliamentary elections of 1994, Chairman
Zinchenko of the Council for Religious Affairs did not stand for
reelection. In the Presidential Election Runoff in June 1994,
President Kravchuk was defeated by Leonid Kuchma. One of
the first acts of newly elected President Kuchma was to disband the Council for Religious Affairs, which was carried out
on July 28, 1994.'~~
By the autumn of 1994, the administration of religious
affairs had not been further clarified. By 1995, however, the
Council for Religious Affairs had been reconstituted as an
l ~ ~ nationalist poliagency within the Ministry of C ~ 1 t u r e . The
cy and the 1993 Amendments of the Freedom of Conscience
Law had not, at this writing, been reversed.

V. CONCLUSION
The Amendments of December 23, 1993, to the 1991 Ukrainian Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations represent a policy of major retreat from full religious
liberty for citizens and noncitizens alike. They represent an
attempt to use the state to control the growth of the newer
religious confessions in Ukraine, in response to appeals by
Orthodox prelates in Ukraine and in various other countries.
They represent a partial return to the historic Soviet and
Tsarist practice of the state limitation of the expansion of religious pluralism.
The Amendments violate Ukraine's obligations under international human rights treaties as well as the spirit and letter
of the 1991 Act. Article 32 of the Law on Freedom of Conscience instructs the government that where Ukrainian legislation contravenes the international treaties, "then the rules of
the international treaty shall be applied."124The Handbook of
the Council for Religious Affairs supports this remedy: "In case

121. Interview with prelate, in Kiev (June 1994); information confirmed by
interview with Deputy of Parliament, in Kiev (June 1994) and also by interview
with Professor of Jurisprudence, in Kiev (June 1994).
122. News broadcast (Radio Ukraine, July 30, 1994).
123. Reported in conversation with representatives of Baker & McKenzie Law
Firm in Moscow and in Kiev (April 1995).
124. Ukrainian Act, supra note 2, art. 32.
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the legislation of Ukraine does not comply with some of [the
international treaty] regulations, these regulations will be in
force until the legislation of Ukraine is brought in correspondence with it."125
In spite of the reining back of the Council for Religious
Mairs, the 1993 Amendments and the nationalist religious
policy continue to stand in Ukraine. The inauguration of the
new Kuchma Administration is a favorable moment for
Ukraine to reverse the retreat from religious liberty that occurred from 1991-94. Article 32 of the 1991 Law should be
invoked to bring Ukrainian legislation and religious practice
into full conformity with the international human rights treaty
obligations which the government of Ukraine has assumed.

125. Handbook for Religious Affairs, supra note 4, at 98-99.

